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ABSTRACT
People often make important decisions based on information elicited from experts
with uncertain decision objectives. We provide a theoretical rationale for the use of
information markets in decision making tasks. Speciﬁcally, we show that markets for
claims on decision-relevant variables can be eﬃcient incentive schemes for eliciting in-
formation. Our model shows decision makers will subsidize liquidity in illiquid decision
markets to gather valuable information. Our model also shows that the mere act of
linking the decision to the market price will typically enhance liquidity in the market.
Overall, our results highlight the potential for using information markets in diverse
decision making tasks.
1 Introduction
People often make important decisions based on information gathered from individual ex-
perts. For example, suppose a farmer must decide how much seed to plant in her ﬁelds.
She could pay individual experts for their rainfall predictions and use these forecasts as the
basis for her seed decision. As an alternative to directly eliciting individual predictions, the
∗Department of Finance, University of Texas at Austin; e-mail: tetlock@mail.utexas.edu.
†AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, DC.
‡Department of Finance, University of Texas at San Antonio.
1farmer could set up a rainfall claims market and use the equilibrium price in this market as
the basis for her decision.1 In this paper, we investigate the properties of these two decision
making algorithms in a stylized setting.
Our study makes three contributions to the theory of information markets and their use
in decision making.2 First, we provide a theoretical rationale for the use of information
markets in decision making tasks.3 Second, we show that decision makers will subsidize
liquidity in illiquid decision markets to gather valuable information.4 We also show that
the decision maker can implement her desired liquidity policy either directly as the market
maker or indirectly as a noise trader participating in a competitive market. Third, our
model demonstrates that the mere act of linking the decision to the market price will typically
enhance liquidity in the market. Thus, liquidity may be less of a problem in decision markets
than in traditional information or asset markets.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to provide a formal theoretical rationale for
either the use of information markets in decision making or the use of liquidity subsidies in
these markets. Overall, our results highlight the potential for using information markets in
diverse decision making tasks.
To illustrate the structure of the model, we consider the situation of a proﬁt-maximizing
farmer, Denise, who must choose how much seed to plant in her ﬁelds. The proﬁt-maximizing
quantity of seeds depends on the uncertain quantity of rain that falls in her county this year.
Two local experts, Larry and Harold, observe signals about future local rainfall. They also
have diﬀerent objectives for the amount of seed they would like Denise to plant. Larry would
like Denise to plant fewer seeds because he is a competing farmer. Harold would like her
to plant more because he is a seed producer. Both Denise and the experts care about their
trading proﬁts and production proﬁts.
To inform her rainfall estimate and seed decision, Denise could either directly ask the
experts for their information, write individual contracts with the experts to obtain their
information or create an anonymous market where the experts could trade based on their
1The term rainfall claims market refers to a market for securities that pay their owners an amount that
depends on realized rainfall. The price in the rainfall claims market could be used as an input to the farmer’s
decision rather than as the sole basis for her decision.
2Markets for contingent claims whose value depends on information have been referred to as information
markets, prediction markets or event futures markets. When the prices from these markets are used in
decision making, they are usually called decision markets–e.g., Hanson (2002a).
3Prior contributions that discuss decision markets include Hanson (2002a) and Ledyard (2005).
4Hanson (2002b) proposes liquidity subsidies for binary outcome information markets with certain desir-
able properties, but does not optimize these subsidies for any particular objective function.
2information. In this paper, we do not model the “cheap talk” game in which Denise asks
the experts, Larry and Harold, for their information, oﬀe r i n gt h e mn oc o m p e n s a t i o n .I nt h e
single-period game we consider here, this method will produce uninformative responses from
the experts when their production objectives diﬀer suﬃciently from the decision maker’s
(Crawford and Sobel, 1982).5
Instead, this paper models contracts and markets in which informed experts voluntar-
ily participate. For example, Denise could write individual or multilateral contracts with
experts oﬀering to pay them for their information. These contracts could oﬀer payments
contingent on the realized rainfall outcome to induce experts to truthfully reveal their rain-
fall information–e.g., see Osband (1989). Writing such contracts will not always be feasible.
Denise would need to be able to identify the experts in advance and also prevent contract
resale.
Alternatively, Denise could set up an anonymous market exchange for contingent con-
tracts that pay $1 per inch of measured rainfall next year in her county. In this case, Denise
or a third-party market maker could mediate purchases and sales of rainfall contracts be-
tween experts, such as competing farmers and seed producers. This rainfall claims market
would diﬀer from conventional ﬁnancial markets in that Denise would explicitly condition
her seed decision on the equilibrium price. Recognizing this, interested experts would have
an incentive to manipulate the price of rainfall contracts to inﬂuence Denise’s seed decision.
For example, seed producers may buy rainfall contracts to increase the prevailing price and
Denise’s seed purchases, even if their private information suggests future rainfall will be low.
For analogous reasons, competing farmers may sell rainfall contracts to lower the prevailing
price of rainfall contracts. The rainfall market resembles a multilateral contract between
the farmer and experts, but does not require that Denise be able to identify trades from
individual experts or prevent contract resale among experts.
Generalizing this example of the seed farmer, we derive eﬃcient contracts and markets
that elicit decision-relevant information. We focus on asset markets for two reasons. First,
in both theory and practice, asset markets aggregate information well–e.g., see Samuelson
(1965) on eﬃcient market theory, Fama (1970, 1991) on capital market evidence and Wolfers
and Zitzewitz (2003) for a survey of information market evidence. Indeed, there is a growing
body of literature that suggests information markets generally do better than experts in
a wide variety of contexts (see, e.g., Plott and Chen (2002)). Second, allowing experts
5Even in this case, informative reputational equilibria may exist in a repeated cheap talk game–e.g.,s e e
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) and Morgan and Stocken (2003).
3to trade in asset markets imposes minimal requirements on the decision maker’s ability to
distinguish and monitor experts. In the extreme, the decision maker need not be involved
at all in the market process, delegating market making activity to third parties. We show
that the optimal contract provides experts with incentives to reveal information similar to
those provided by a market in which experts trade rainfall claims. In both our contracting
and market models, some intervention by the decision maker is optimal. In particular, the
decision maker is sometimes willing to sacriﬁce trading proﬁts to induce experts to reveal
more information.
The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of related work. Section 3
introduces the modeling framework to be used throughout the paper. Section 4 solves the
optimal contracting problem for a decision maker eliciting information from experts with
diﬀerent production objectives from the decision maker. This section analyzes both the case
in which experts’ objectives are known and the case when these objectives are unknown
to the decision maker. In Section 5, we explore the properties of a simpliﬁed version of
the optimal contract that does not require identifying traders. Section 6 concludes with
a discussion of the applications, limitations, and directions for future research in decision
markets.
2 Literature Review
Our basic modeling approach draws on insights from several areas, including contract theory,
mechanism design and ﬁnance. In closely related work in contract theory, Osband (1989)
examines the eﬃciency of contracts in motivating a forecaster to acquire and truthfully report
information used in decisions. In contrast to our model, Osband (1989) assumes experts have
no stake in the outcome of the decision.6
In the mechanism design literature, Gerardi, Postlewaite, and McLean (2005) show how a
decision maker can elicit useful information from experts, but these authors do not consider
contracts with contingent payments. In their model, the decision maker can approximately
attain her preferred outcome when information is spread diﬀusely across experts.7 The mech-
6Other diﬀerences between our contracting model and Osband’s include our analysis of multiple bilateral
contracts and multilateral contracts. By contrast, Osband looks at competitive bidding between multiple
forecasters for the right to participate in a single bilateral contract. Our model also does not address the
moral hazard problem posed by information acquisition, instead examining experts who already possess
decision-relevant information.
7More precisely, the condition required is that experts are “informationally small” in the sense of McLean
and Postlewaite (2002).
4anism used by Gerardi et al.(2005) compares experts’ reports of information and punishes
those experts with anomalous reports because these are less likely to be correct. Although
their mechanism does not require contingent contracts, it is vulnerable to collusion among
experts and ineﬀective when information is concentrated among a few experts. In contrast,
the decision algorithms we examine are less susceptible to collusion and information concen-
tration, but do require the use of contingent contracts.
Our treatment of decision market liquidity draws heavily on important results in ﬁnance.
Milgrom and Stokey’s (1982) no-trade theorem is particularly relevant because it provides
conditions under which no transactions will occur in asset markets. A lack of trading volume
will severely impede the price discovery process and any attempts to use transaction prices
for decision making.
Our model of a decision market builds on the microstructure model in Kyle (1985). We
also adopt our deﬁnition of market liquidity from Kyle (1985), who advocates using price
sensitivity to aggregate order ﬂow. Liquidity is the inverse of price sensitivity, meaning a
liquid market is one in which traders can transact in large quantities without moving prices
substantially. Our model’s results on liquidity also build on Kyle (1985). Speciﬁcally, when
experts have too much information relative to how much they care about inﬂuencing the
decision, it will be optimal for a decision maker to provide liquidity.
Finally, our model resembles the model of price manipulation developed by Hanson and
Oprea (2004), which also builds on Kyle (1985) However, our model adopts the perspective
of the decision maker, whereas Hanson and Oprea (2004) do not explicitly link decisions to
information market prices. By making this linkage, we can explicitly solve for the decision
maker’s optimal policy conditional on market prices. In addition, we can address questions
such as how should the decision maker design an information market to maximize her welfare.
3 Modeling Framework
Throughout the analysis, we assume there is an informative signal of decision-relevant in-
formation that can be veriﬁed ex post. For example, a farmer’s choice of how much seed
to plant in a given year may depend on her best forecast of annual rainfall. After a year
has elapsed, a veriﬁable signal of decision-relevant information would be the annual rainfall
5measure reported by the National Weather Service for the farmer’s county.8,9
A decision maker will make a judgment or forecast (x) of decision-relevant information
(y) based on experts’ reports. For simplicity and tractability, we assume that both the
decision maker and experts are risk-neutral with additively separable utility in judgment
accuracy and monetary transfers. Let the decision maker’s production objectives be given by
u0(y,x)=−(y−x)2−t,w h e r ey is the realization of uncertain decision-relevant information
that will be revealed ex post and t is a transfer payment from the decision maker.
The interpretation is that the decision maker prefers more accurate forecasts of the
decision-relevant information (y) and prefers lower transfer payments. A concrete exam-
ple of decision-relevant information could be an ex post signal of rainfall for a farmer whose
decision of how much seed to plant depends on rainfall. The decision maker receives greater
production proﬁts when her forecast is closer to the expected value of decision-relevant in-
formation because she can then implement a better production plan.
To maximize her utility, the decision maker can elicit information from experts. Initially,
all experts and the decision maker have a prior belief about y, which we normalize to zero, so
that E(y)=0and Va r(y) ≡ V0. If the decision maker requests advice from expert i, then this
expert costlessly observes a private informative signal (si) that reveals further information
about y,w h e r eE(y|si)=si and Va r(y|si) ≡ Vi. For tractability, we assume all signals
si and the prior belief are normally distributed and independent conditional on y.A f t e r

















We denote expert i’s utility as ui(y,x)=−c(y − x + θi)2 + ti,w h e r ei ∈ {1,...,N}, θi
is a parameter describing the magnitude and direction of expert i’s conﬂict of interest with
the decision maker and ti is the transfer payment received by expert i.T h ep a r a m e t e rc>0
describes how much an expert cares about the decision outcome relative to the decision
8An important simplifying feature of this example is that the realization of policy-relevant information
(e.g., rainfall) is independent of the decision maker’s policy (e.g., the farmer’s decision of how much seed to
plant). Although we adopt this restrictive assumption in most of our models below, allowing the signal to
depend on the policy choice would not change the main qualitative results.
9Some readers may doubt that such a veriﬁable signal exists in many private decision and public policy
applications. For example, consider a decision maker who wants to know the causal impact of a tax cut
on gross domestic product (GDP). Ex ante measurement of the causal eﬀect would seem to require that an
observer re-run history with and without the tax cut to measure the diﬀerence in GDP. In a related article
we are writing, we show that even causal eﬀects are amenable to the modeling framework in this article.
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) propose an alternative method based on instrumental variables. Abramowicz
(2004) advocates the use of contracts based on ex post cost-beneﬁt analyses of policies.
6maker—e.g., c =1describes an expert with equally strong production objectives, but not
necessarily objectives that are well-aligned with the decision maker’s (i.e.,i fθi 6=0 ).
In a multilateral contract with the decision maker, the expert’s transfer payment will
depend on his information report (b si), other experts’ reports (b s−i) and the realization of
decision-relevant information (y). When the expert’s objective (θi) is unknown, the transfer
payment can also depend on the expert’s reported type (b θi). In a multilateral contract,
the expert’s payment can depend on his reported signal and type and the reported signals
(b s−i)a n dt y p e so fo t h e r s( b θ−i). For notational convenience, we denote the vector of all
reported signals as b s =( b si,b s−i) and the vector of all types as b θ =( b θi,b θ−i).W ei m p o s et h e
budget balance constraint that the decision maker’s transfer payment must equal the sum




The last part of a contract stipulates the decision rule x(b s)—or x(b s,b θ) if experts types are
unknown—that will be used by the decision maker. Ideally, the decision maker would select
the optimal decision for herself given the information revealed by the expert, but this may
not be feasible. In order to induce the expert to reveal decision-relevant information, the
decision maker may be willing to sacriﬁce some autonomy. However, in this paper, we will
assume that the decision maker cannot contractually commit to decision rules that are not
in her best interest after observing experts’ reports.10
The decision maker’s optimal contract with an expert will, in general, depend on assump-
tions about the nature and magnitude of information asymmetry. In our simple setting,
however, the optimal contract will not depend on the type of individual rationality con-
straint we impose.11 This is because we focus on the class of contracts that gives all experts
non-negative expected transfer payments, which is more limiting than imposing individual
rationality constraints. The motivation for this restriction is that competitive oﬀers from
third parties with no control over the decision would ensure that ex ante transfers to ex-
perts must be weakly positive. Regardless of whether experts know their private information
10Fortunately, in all models but the model in Section 5, our assumption of no commitment has no eﬀect
on our results. Even in the last model, our qualitative results would not change if we allowed the decision
maker to commit to suboptimal decision rules.
11An alternative reason to relax individual rationality constraints is that participation in information
elicitation mechanisms may occur for completely irrational reasons. For example, there is a voluminous
literature documenting overconﬁdence among experts. Overconﬁdent experts will be especially eager to
participate in the mechanisms we model in this paper. Overconﬁdent experts in our setting could easily be
modeled by incorporating the realization of their private signals (si)i nt h e i rt y p e s( θi).
7and objectives before contracting, the non-negative transfer restriction will be binding and
individual rationality constraints can be ignored.12
We refer to asset markets as arrangements in which contingent contracts of a speciﬁc
form are traded among experts and a competitive proﬁt-maximizing market maker (which
may be the decision maker herself). The structure of these markets is analogous to the
setup in Kyle (1985). In a batch auction, traders submit market orders conditional on their
information and types. A market maker sets prices conditional on observed aggregate order
ﬂow. The market equilibrium results in a single clearing price,13 which can be used by the
decision maker to improve her decision. We assume experts anticipate the dependence of the
decision on the market price so they may attempt to manipulate that price.
We will think of an “asset market” as a particular kind of multilateral contract. To see the
similarity for the model described above, ﬁrst note that the market order of expert i takes the




The transfer payments to experts are the experts’ proﬁts: ti(b s,b θ)=qi(b si,b θi)(y − p(b s,b θ)).
T h es u mo ft h ep r o ﬁts made by experts in the market is equal and opposite to the market
maker’s (or decision maker’s) proﬁts, which is the same budget balance constraint imposed
earlier on the set of contracts. Finally, the decision maker’s decision rule can be described
as x(b s,b θ)=x(p(b s,b θ)). We identify the conditions under which the types of contracts we
call asset markets are optimal contracts for the decision maker. Then we examine how asset
markets can be designed to meet the needs of the decision maker.14
4 Designing Optimal Contracts
In this section, we investigate what type of contract a decision maker would choose to write
with experts she can uniquely identify. This analysis provides insights about the form of
the optimal contract and its dependence on experts’ decision objectives and information
12We will prove this result in section 4.
13In sequential trade models such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985), there can be two prices–one for buyers
and one for sellers.
14The single clearing price may seem restrictive, ruling out a mechanism similar to a limit order book. For
example, it seems reasonable to allow some price discrimination based on the size of a trader’s order. But
any such price discrimination would require that a market maker be able to distinguish each trader’s order.
Otherwise, traders wanting to trade large orders could submit several small orders through intermediaries
to obtain a better average price. The only non-manipulable anonymous market making rules are of the form
p = p(
P
qi) as described above.
8precision. The design of the optimal contract reﬂects the decision maker’s desire to obtain
accurate information from experts at a low cost. Speciﬁcally, the optimal contract pro-
vides transfers to experts that are equivalent to trading proﬁts in a hypothetical market
for decision-relevant information. We initially demonstrate this result for the simple case in
which experts’ objectives are publicly observable.
Next, we derive a similar form for the optimal contract in the case where experts’ objec-
tives are unobservable. The key parameter in these optimal contracts has an interpretation
as a measure of market liquidity in the equivalent market environment. We show that the
decision maker’s optimal contract provides greater liquidity to experts than a competitive
market maker would provide. The intuition is that greater liquidity elicits more informed
trading from experts. Also consistent with this intuition, the decision maker provides the
greatest liquidity subsidies to experts with greater information precision.
4.1 Contracts when Experts’ Objectives Are Observable
As a useful benchmark, we ﬁr s te x a m i n et h es i m p l ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ed e c i s i o nm a k e rw r i t e s
a multilateral contract with N experts with known objectives (θi). We assume the decision
maker knows each expert i’s signal has precision V
−1
i , but does not know the realization of
his signal (si). The decision maker chooses a set of transfer payments ti and decision rule












subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and non-negative expected transfer
constraints for the N experts.
To identify the optimal contract, it is useful to consider the decision maker’s utility
in the hypothetical situation where she could observe the experts’ private signals directly.
In this case, the decision maker would implement the posterior mean of y and make zero











≡ x∗(s),w h e r ex∗(s) is the optimal decision rule given the observed vector of











kisi. To simplify notation further, let ri = kisi be
an expert’s true contribution to the optimal decision and b ri be his report to the decision
9maker.15 If the same decision rule x∗(r)=
P
rj a n de x p e c t e dt r a n s f e rp a y m e n t sE(ti)=0
are feasible when the decision maker cannot observe the experts’ signals, then the contract
that implements x∗(r) and E(ti)=0must be optimal.
To look for such a contract, we ﬁrst assume that the decision maker will implement
her posterior based on all experts’ reports x = x∗(b s).I f a n y e x p e r t i rejects the contract,
the decision maker will implement her posterior conditional on all reported signals—i.e.,
x = x∗(b s−i)—to minimize the expected squared deviation of y from x. In this case, expert
i receives no transfer, but still cares about the decision outcome. In equilibrium, we will
verify that no expert will have an incentive to reject the transfer and decision rule oﬀered
by the decision maker. That is, the individual rationality constraint will not be violated for
any expert.
Proposition 1 identiﬁes the functional form of the transfer function that allows the deci-
sion maker to implement x∗.
Proposition 1 When experts’ objectives (θi) are observable, the decision maker maximizes
welfare using the decision rule x∗(b r)=
P
b rj and transfer rule t∗
i(b r,y)=2 cθi(y −
P
b rj).
Proof. See Appendix A.
An important beneﬁt of this particular contract is that the decision maker need not be
able to commit to using the decision rule x∗(b r)=
P
b rj. First, the decision maker oﬀers
the payments t∗ to experts. Next, the experts will report truthfully. After learning of these
reports, the decision maker will optimally use the rule x∗ regardless of whether or not she
has committed to this rule because x∗ minimizes her loss function conditional on experts’
truthful reports.
The optimal contract with multiple experts with known heterogeneous objectives has an
interesting market analog. Consider a market in which there are contingent claims that each
pay an amount y and are priced at p(b r)=
P
b rj. The expert’s optimal transfer function is
equal to his proﬁt from purchasing a quantity 2cθi of these contingent contracts. The optimal
transfer gives experts with more extreme types (θi further from zero) greater incentives to
report moderate signals (b ri closer to zero). For example, because experts with large positive
objectives receive a greater number of contracts and lower signals reduce the price of these
contracts, large positive objectives will have a ﬁnancial incentive to understate their reports.
15Note that the posterior assumes this general form as long as the signals come from a probability distrib-
ution within the exponential family and the prior information is a conjugate prior for the signal distribution.
Thus, most of the results below generalize beyond normal distributions.
10This is desirable because, without this ﬁnancial incentive, experts with large positive ob-
jectives would overstate their reports to inﬂuence the decision in their favor. The optimal
contract balances these competing incentives perfectly, leading to truthful revelation.
Under the market interpretation, we can interpret the decision maker’s decision rule as a
price setting rule because x∗(b r)=p(b r)=
P
b rj. The decision maker acts as a market maker
that oﬀsets any imbalance in supply and demand created by an uneven distribution of expert
objectives. The total net demand of contingent contracts is −2c
P
θj. In equilibrium, the
market price and the decision depends more on the reports of experts with more precise
information because rj = kjsj where kj is proportional to expert j’s signal precision.
To understand the intuition behind the market-like mechanism, let’s reconsider our ex-
ample with the farmer trying to elicit information from rainfall experts with conﬂicting
objectives. Suppose there is a seed producer with information about rainfall who would like
the farmer to believe rainfall will be 10 inches higher than the truth, leading to increased
seed planting; and there is a competing farmer with information about rainfall who would
like the farmer to believe rainfall will be 10 inches lower than the truth, leading to reduced
seed planting. The farmer can oﬀer to be the counterparty to the seed producer and the
competing farmer in two rainfall contract transactions, where a rainfall contract pays oﬀ $1
per inch of measured rainfall.
Speciﬁcally, she can oﬀer the seed producer the opportunity to purchase 10 rainfall con-
tracts and the competing farmer the opportunity to sell 10 rainfall contracts at a price equal
to the precision-weighted average of their rainfall reports. This can be thought of as asking
each expert to “put his money where his mouth is.” Both agents will accept these contract
oﬀers and reveal their true rainfall expectations to the farmer, anticipating that the farmer
will make his seed decision based on the precision-weighted average of their rainfall reports.
In this particular example, the farmer takes no net position in rainfall contracts because
the seed producer and the competing farmer have exactly oﬀsetting objectives. In the more
general case, the farmer assumes a position opposing the average expert objective. He makes
zero expected proﬁt in either case.
As we will show formally in section 5, the example does not rely on the assumption that
the farmer can identify the individual experts. The farmer only needs an estimate of the
distribution of experts’ objectives. She can then set a price and make a decision based on
the aggregate of all experts’ reports and her best estimate of the distribution of experts’
objectives.
Interestingly, the mere act of linking the farmer’s seed decision to the market price of
11rainfall increases rainfall market liquidity. To see this point, we can compare the trading
volume in a decision market for rainfall claims to the volume in an information market
in which the farmer’s seed decision is not linked to the price of rainfall. In the decision
market equilibrium above, no expert is making excess trading proﬁts and the decision maker
is operating as a market maker with zero expected trading proﬁts. Experts who want the
farmer to plant more seed buy rainfall contractsa tf a i rp r i c e sf r o me x p e r t sw h oh a v eo p p o s i t e
objectives. These diﬀerences in objectives are the only source of trading volume.
By contrast, in an information market equilibrium in which the seed decision is not linked
to the price of rainfall, there would be no trade in the market for rainfall claims. The classic
no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) would apply because each of the N experts
has asymmetric information about the asset’s payoﬀ. In addition, the diﬀerences in experts’
decision objectives that could be used in a decision market to mitigate this information
asymmetry are irrelevant in a pure information market. If the N experts submitted market
orders for quantities of the contingent claims on rainfall, then no market maker would be
willing to accept their orders. A decentralized market would fail, too, because no rational
informed expert would be willing to conduct a bilateral trade with another rational informed
expert.
4.2 Contracts when Experts’ Objectives Are Unobservable
Now we extend the basic model to allow for the possibility that the decision objective (θi)
o fe a c he x p e r ti sk n o w no n l yb yt h ee x p e r t .F rom the perspective of the decision maker, θi
is normally distributed with E(θi)=0and Va r(θi)=Vθ.16 For simplicity, we assume that
the realizations of θi are independent across experts.17 We also retain the same assumptions
about expert and decision maker objectives in the basic model above.
Writing an optimal contract with an expert who has private information about both
his signal si and his type θi is a two-dimensional mechanism design problem. With the
assumptions above, this problem can be solved by collapsing the two-dimensional uncertainty
about experts into one dimension. The idea is to ﬁnd a suﬃcient statistic for representing
(si,θ i). Similar to Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000), the two-dimensional problem can
be recast by deﬁning the suﬃcient statistic as the single type.
16The problem is identical when θi has a non-zero expectation that is known to the decision maker.
17The form of the optimal contract does not change when experts’ objectives are correlated.













Examining the right-hand side of equation (2), we note that the expert’s utility depends on
his true type and signal only through the term visi + θi,w h i c hi sas u ﬃcient statistic for








Applying the suﬃcient statistic theorem in Holmstrom (1979), the mechanism designer
can restrict herself to the class of mechanisms in which agents truthfully reveal the suﬃcient
statistic for their types. We redeﬁne ηi = si + θi/vi a st h ee x p e r t ’ st r u et y p ei nt h et r a n s -
formed problem in which the experts’ incentive compatibility constraints are b η
∗
i = ηi.18 Now
the decision maker picks transfers ti(η,y) and a decision rule x(η) to maximize her utility.
Once again, if the decision maker were able to directly observe η, then her problem would
be much easier. She would again implement x∗ = E(y|η) and set expected transfers to zero
for all experts. Note that x∗ = E(y|η)=
X











Vθ)−1.I ft h e r e
exists a contract that replicates this outcome when η is unobservable, then this contract
must be optimal.
To simplify the presentation of our results, we redeﬁne the type and reported type once
more as γi = wiηi = wi(si+θi/vi) and b γi = wib ηi. We next search for a set of transfer functions
that implements the optimal decision rule x∗ = E(y|η)=
X
γi and oﬀers expected payments
of zero to all experts. As in the previous model, because this transfer function implements
the decision rule x∗ = E(y|η), the decision maker does not need to commit to any decisions
she will be unwilling to carry out after learning experts’ signals.
Applying the same logic that led to Proposition 1, we can identify the optimal transfer
rule associated with this decision rule. The proposition below describes the optimal contract:
Proposition 2 When experts’ objectives (θi) are unobservable, the decision maker maxi-
mizes welfare using the decision rule x∗(b γ)=
P




j b γj) − ti,w h e r eα1i > 0, α2i > 0,a n dti are given by:





























Proof. See Appendix A.
The form of the optimal contract is intuitive in our farmer example. The farmer, Denise,
oﬀers transfers to the rainfall experts, Harold and Larry, that depend on their individual
reports b γi and the sum of their reports (
P
j b γj). These transfers are designed so that both
experts have an incentive to truthfully reveal their types γi = wi(si+θi/vi), which depend on
their rainfall signals (si) and seed planting objectives (θi). All else equal, the seed producer,
Harold, will announce a higher rainfall report than the competing farmer, Larry, because
Harold prefers more seed to be planted than Larry (e.g., θH >θ L). However, both experts
will incorporate their rainfall signals in their rainfall reports, too.
In making her seed planting decision, Denise chooses a seed level equal to the sum of
Harold and Larry’s reports (x∗(b γ)=
P
b γj). Although she cannot be assured that Harold
and Larry have exactly oﬀsetting objectives, by aggregating their reports Denise will reduce
the inﬂuence of idiosyncratic variation in objectives on her decision. In addition, because
all experts’s reports contain their signals about a common rainfall amount, the information
contained in their reports will be preserved in the aggregation process. Thus, Denise’s
decision will reﬂect as much information-based reporting and as little manipulative reporting
as possible.
Once again, the optimal transfer function has an interesting market analog. It is the
proﬁtf u n c t i o nf o re x p e r ti who buys b γi contingent claims that each pay an amount y and




j b γj.T h ep a r a m e t e rα1i is a multiplicative weight that ampliﬁes
the expert’s proﬁt in the market. In equilibrium, the decision maker sets this parameter just
high enough to oﬀset the expert’s desire to inﬂuence the decision in his favor. That is, α1i
ensures that the expert’s proﬁt motivation counteracts his policy objectives. The parameter
α1i can be viewed as an exchange rate between decision utility and money. Intuitively, when
an expert cares more about the decision (higher c), then his proﬁt si nt h em a r k e tm u s tb e
greater to motivate him to reveal his information rather than his decision objectives.




j b γj adopted by the decision maker also has an in-
teresting interpretation. Because the decision maker can distinguish among experts with
diﬀerent signal quality (V
−1
i ), he chooses a pricing function that discriminates to maximize
14his surplus. The ratio
α2i
α1i describes the sensitivity of price to an expert’s quantity. The
inverse of price sensitivity can be interpreted as market liquidity.
There is a single market clearing price when all experts have the same signal quality
(V
−1




j b γj) − t.
In this case, the market depicted here is very similar to the competitive market modeled
in Kyle (1985). The main diﬀerences are the entrance fee t and the particular liquidity
parameter chosen by market maker, who is also the decision maker here. The competitive
market maker in Kyle (1985) does not make any decision based on the market price, whereas
the market maker here is also selecting x =
P
b γi. Rather than setting the price equal to the





j b γj =
α2i
α1ix,w h e r e
α2i
α1i 6=1 . We explain the intuition for this result below.
The liquidity parameter α2
α1 is directly analogous to Kyle’s λ parameter. If this market
were competitive, then the market maker would set prices according to the conditional
expectation of y depending on order ﬂow
P
b γi. F r o ma b o v e ,w ek n o wt h i sw o u l db et h e
pricing rule of pi(b γ)=
P
j b γj, which implies that λ =
α2i
α1i =1 . For the decision market
presented here, we can show the following:
Proposition 3 When Vθ is suﬃciently small, then
α2
α1 < 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Recall that α2
α1 is a measure of illiquidity or the inverse of liquidity. In words, the proposi-
tion states that the decision maker will provide greater liquidity than a competitive market
maker (
α2
α1 < 1)w h e nt h e r ei ss u ﬃcient asymmetric information–i.e.,t h e r ea r ef e we x p e r t s
trading based on their decision objectives relative to those trading based on their informa-
tion. A decision maker who provides greater liquidity than a zero-proﬁtm a r k e tm a k e rw i l l
expect to incur losses from her market making activity. The idea is that the decision maker
subsidizes liquidity in the decision market to elicit valuable information from experts via
their trades. Such a subsidy makes sense only when there is a lot of valuable information
(large V0) relative to the amount of trading based on uncertainty in experts’ decision ob-
jectives (small Vθ). The beneﬁts of the subsidy depend on the information revealed in the
price. The cost of providing liquidity is oﬀering better deals to traders trying to inﬂuence
the decision–i.e., lower prices to buyers and higher prices to sellers.
Another interpretation of Proposition 3 is that liquidity provided by manipulative trade
and liquidity provided by the decision maker are substitutes. When there is suﬃcient manip-
ulative trade to motivate informed trade, then the decision maker does not need to subsidize
15liquidity. Supporting this interpretation, we have also shown in results not presented here
that allowing correlation between experts objectives decreases the liquidity provided by the
decision maker. When experts objectives are correlated, their manipulative trades will not
cancel each other in the aggregate. This means that total order ﬂow will depend more on
the realizations of experts’ objectives (θ), encouraging increased information-based trade and
diminishing the need for the decision maker to subsidize liquidity. The results in section 5
further reinforce this interpretation.
Proposition 3 does not specify exactly how small Vθ needs to be relative to V0 for the
decision maker to subsidize liquidity. To gain some intuition, consider the simple case in
which there are many experts (N →∞ ) who each observe perfect signals of y (Vi =0 ).
In this situation, the decision maker will subsidize liquidity if and only if Vθ <V 0.I f t h e
variance in experts objectives is less than the variance in their informative signals, then the
decision maker can improve her welfare by subsidizing liquidity to obtain better information
from prices.
In the optimal contract, the decision maker takes back this expected liquidity subsidy
from the experts opting to trade in the market by levying the entrance fee t.O n e c a n
think of t as the expected loss of the market maker who oﬀers a liquidity schedule with
price sensitivity
α2
α1. As shown above in the general case in which experts signal precision
may diﬀer, the optimal pricing schedule supplied to an expert
α2i
α1i will depend on the expert’s
signal precision. The following proposition identiﬁes the experts to whom the decision maker
would oﬀer the greatest liquidity subsidies:





Proof. See Appendix A.
In situations where the decision maker would like to subsidize liquidity (i.e.,s m a l lVθ),
the decision maker is willing to subsidize liquidity (
α1i
α2i) most for the experts with better
information (higher V
−1
i ). Again, the intuition is that subsidizing liquidity motivates more
informed trading, which improves the accuracy of the decision because it is based on the
market price. If it is possible to identify which traders have better information, then targeting
the liquidity subsidy toward these traders is eﬃcient.
4.3 Discussion
The results above should not be taken too literally because our model’s assumptions do not
capture many of the complexities of empirical environments. First, real experts may not be
16risk-neutral and do not have unlimited wealth to wager in markets. The contract described
above requires that experts with extreme type values (γi)p u r c h a s ee x t r e m e l yl a r g et r a d i n g
positions, which may be infeasible for wealth-constrained experts or unacceptable for risk-
averse experts. Second, it is not costless to participate in a market and acquire information.
Adding costly information acquisition to our model is likely to increase the decision maker’s
liquidity subsidy through the channel described in Hanson and Oprea (2004). In addition
to motivating increases in the strength of bets given their information, a liquidity subsidy
would motivate increased information collection by traders.
Our model does not capture certain features of markets that encourage trade even without
liquidity subsidies. For example, there is mounting evidence that experts and traders are
overconﬁdent in the precision of their private information. If this is true, then many agents
will trade in the market even without liquidity subsidies or diﬀerences in decision objectives.
Moreover, the individual rationality constraints may be relaxed somewhat because each
expert has an inﬂated expectation of his expected trading proﬁts in the market.
Notwithstanding its limitations, the model here demonstrates that a properly designed
market may be a practical means for collecting decision-relevant information from experts
with uncertain decision objectives. Our results also suggest using a speciﬁcm a r k e ti n t e r -
vention: a liquidity subsidy to facilitate information collection. The desired extent of this
intervention will depend on the precision of experts’ information and the uncertainty in their
decision objectives.
5 Linking Contracts to Markets
To show an exact equivalence between the optimal contract and a decision market, we have
sacriﬁced some realism. In particular, the decision market portrayed above requires that the
decision maker be able to distinguish among traders, which is not possible in many situations.
Moreover, there are alternative modeling assumptions in which the correspondence between
the optimal contract and a decision market will not be exact. The point of the previous model
is not to suggest that decision markets of the form described above are always optimal, but
to demonstrate why decision markets should be considered viable decision making tools.
In this section, we make two realistic modiﬁcations to the optimal contract above that
naturally lead us to consider a simpler decision market, which shares many of the features of
Kyle’s (1985) market microstructure model. First, we suppose that decision makers cannot
identify individual traders. Second, we suppose that the decision maker cannot commit to a
17decision rule that is not in her best interest after the market clears. Appendix B provides a
more formal discussion and motivation for these assumptions.
We then show that our most important qualitative insights into contract design (e.g.,
Propositions 2 and 3) also apply to the design of this anonymous decision market. The
decision maker again makes a decision based on the market clearing price, which is a linear
function of traders’ signals and their decision objectives. Again, to improve the quality of
information on which her decision is based, the decision maker subsidizes liquidity in illiquid
decision markets with little manipulative trade.
This modeling approach has three main beneﬁts. First, it is reassuring that our results
generalize to more traditional market models, such as Kyle (1985). Second, the tractability
of the Kyle-type model facilitates comparisons between diﬀerent market designs, such as
the equilibrium under a decision market maker versus a competitive market maker. Third,
the familiarity of the Kyle-type framework is helpful for providing intuition into optimal
market-based decision rules and liquidity subsidies.
5.1 Modeling Decision Markets
In our model of an anonymous decision market, we make several simplifying assumptions
to obtain tractable solutions. Again, we consider a single decision market in which the
information desired is unrelated to the alternative chosen—e.g., the farmer’s choice of how
much seed to plant does not aﬀect rainfall. There is only one uncertain piece of information
y as in the original model.
Our model of a decision market closely resembles Kyle (1985). We consider a standard
market for contingent contracts, each yielding an uncertain amount y, but we add the feature
that the decision maker selects a decision x after observing the market clearing price for
contingent contracts. We assume there is a single informed trader who observes a perfect
signal of decision-relevant information, implying that s = y. This informed trader has
no interest in the decision selected (x). However, there is also a single manipulator with
quadratic decision objectives described by θ as in the earlier models. The manipulator has
no private information about y.
Traders submit market orders to a market maker who sets a clearing price in a batch
auction. We will consider the equilibrium under both a competitive market maker (as in
Kyle (1985)) and a decision maker who sets an asset price p in response to aggregate order
18ﬂow Q from traders. The decision maker can only make the market if he oﬀers traders a
better price than a competitive market maker.
The informed trader submits his market order qI before he knows the equilibrium price,
but after viewing his private signal s. Total order ﬂow Q comes from the two anonymous
traders: the informed rational trader and the uninformed manipulator. Thus, Q = qI +
qM,w h e r eqI is the quantity demanded by the informed trader and qM is the quantity
demanded by the manipulator. We consider only a single informed trader and a single
manipulator because our model’s qualitative results depend only on the aggregate order ﬂow
from informed traders and manipulators, not on the composition of these groups.19
The market maker aggregates the informed and manipulator orders and forms a pricing
rule p(Q).N o t et h a tp = E(y|Q) is the competitive rule, which guarantees zero proﬁts. In
theory, the decision market maker can select any pricing rule in which she incurs expected
losses for any order ﬂow amount. Following Kyle (1985), we consider only linear pricing
rules. This restriction simpliﬁes the exposition and preserves the analogy to the optimal
contract examined in section 4.
We also assume the decision maker cannot commit to a suboptimal decision after observ-
ing the price, implying that her decision rule is x = E(y|Q). Given his signal s,t h ei n f o r m e d
trader chooses his asset demand to maximize his expected trading proﬁts, which implies:
qI ∈ argmax
e qI
{Ey [Eθ [b qI(y − p(Q(b qI)))|s]]} (6)
We look for an equilibrium in which the market maker’s price depends linearly on order
ﬂow, traders orders depend linearly on their private signals and decision objectives, and the
decision maker’s policy rule depends linearly on the asset price:20,21
p = λQ (7)
qI = bIs (8)
qM = bMθ (9)
19A formal proof of this point is available from the authors upon request.
20There is also a symmetric linear equilibrium in which there are many identical informed traders and
manipulators. Symmetric refers to the fact that all traders of the same type use the same quantity strategy,
but do not necessarily submit the same actual quantities.
21In this linear equilibrium, the constants in the pricing rule, quantity strategies, and decision rule must
be zero as a result of our assumption that the common prior estimate of y is zero.
19x = kp (10)
We assume that the manipulator’s decision objective θ is normally distributed as N(0,V θ).
We also assume y is normally distributed as N(0,V 0).
We must verify that such an equilibrium exists. For the case in which the market maker is
competitive, Proposition 5 characterizes the market maker’s equilibrium pricing rule, decision
rule, and their comparative statics along with traders’ equilibrium strategies.







V0) when Vθ > V0
4 and refuse to operate otherwise. The decision rule is x = p =
s/2+θ/2 when the market maker is competitive. A competitive market maker supplies
more liquidity (λ
−1
c is higher) when the manipulator has stronger objectives (c increases) or
more uncertain objectives (Vθ increases), or the informed trader has less information (V0 de-








V0 s and the manipulator








Vθ θ when Vθ > V0
4 . Otherwise, both traders will
not trade.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A few remarks are in order. First, a competitive market maker will not supply any
liquidity unless Vθ >
V0
4 . If the asymmetric information problem is too severe, then the
competitive market maker cannot oﬀer any liquidity and still make zero proﬁts. Second,
the competitive market maker supplies more liquidity when the asymmetric information
problem is less severe (dλc
dc < 0, dλc
dVθ < 0 and dλc
dV0 > 0). This result is analogous to Kyle’s
(1985) liquidity results.
Third, because the competitive market maker always sets a fair price such that p =
E(y|Q), the decision maker can directly use this unbiased estimator of decision-relevant
information in her decision rule—i.e., x = p.I n t u i t i v e l y ,k =1because the market price is
the minimum variance, unbiased estimate of decision-relevant information.22 The decision
maker wants to implement her best estimate of decision-relevant information and she can do
no better than the competitive market maker who observes order ﬂow information.
Fourth, the decision maker sets x = p = λcQ = s/2+θ/2. Exactly analogous to the
contract model in section 4, the decision maker selects a judgment based on a linear com-
bination of traders’ signals and their objectives. In this special case, signals and objectives
are given equal weights in the decision maker’s judgment.
22The market price has the minimum variance among all unbiased publicly available estimators of decision-
relevant information. By assumption, the informed trader has perfect private information (s = y).
20Now consider the case in which the decision maker also makes the market for decision-
relevant information. The decision maker will anticipate using a decision rule k(λ) when
she picks her liquidity parameter λ to maximize her utility. Her utility depends on both the
conditional variance of decision-relevant information and her liquidity subsidy costs. The
decision maker will incur a trading loss if she subsidizes liquidity provision–i.e., sets λ
below λc–but she may gain by increasing the informativeness of order ﬂow. Recall that
the decision maker cannot earn positive proﬁts as a market maker because she faces perfect
competition from other uninformed market makers.
Before explicitly solving for the equilibrium in this market, we note two interesting fea-
tures of the equilibrium. First, there is a clear distinction between a decision market and
an information market. When k =0 , the market described above is an information market
because there is no decision linked to the market price. No uninformed trade would occur
in this information market because there is no reason to manipulate the price. Thus, prices
would be perfectly revealing, negating the incentive for the informed trader to trade. How-
ever, when k>0 and the price in the market is linked to the decision, the manipulator will
want to inﬂuence the price to aﬀect the decision. This enables the informed trader to proﬁt,
so trade will take place.
Second, when there is no uncertainty in whether the manipulator will want to inﬂuence
the decision (i.e., c =0or Vθ =0 ), a competitive market maker will refuse to operate.
In this case, the insider is unwilling to trade because prices would be perfectly revealing if
he did trade. However, a decision market maker would be willing to operate at a loss up
to V0, which is the (monetized) value of the insider’s perfect information.23 Pushing this
logic further, we can ask whether the decision market maker will be willing to operate in
other situations in which adverse selection is so great that the competitive market marker
would not be willing to operate–e.g., 0 <V θ ≤ V0
4 . Proposition 6 addresses this question by
characterizing the equilibrium when the decision maker makes the market.
Proposition 6 When Vθ ≥ V0
4 (1+c−1)2, a decision maker who makes a market for decision-
relevant information will select a pricing rule p = λ
∗Q such that λ
∗ = λc,w h e r eλc is








At these values of Vθ, the decision maker will not intervene in the market. However, for
intermediate values in which V0
4 <V θ < V0
4 (1+c−1)2, the decision maker will act as a market
maker with a price sensitivity of λ
∗ <λ c.F u r t h e r m o r e ,f o r0 <V θ ≤ V0
4 , the decision maker
23This can be seen by computing the diﬀerence between the decision maker’s quadratic decision outcome
utility under perfect information and no information.
21will set a ﬁnite λ
∗, whereas a competitive market maker will not operate. In the cases in
which 0 <V θ < V0
4 (1 + c−1)2, the decision market maker incurs non-zero trading losses, but
obtains more precise decision-relevant information than the competitive market maker.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 6 makes two important and related points. First, the decision maker never
provides less liquidity than a competitive market maker. In particular, the decision maker
provides strictly more liquidity in illiquid markets where there is little manipulative trade.
This result is analogous to Proposition 3, which describes the liquidity subsidy provided by
a decision maker in the optimal contract with uniquely identiﬁable traders.
Second, the decision market maker will always operate in the situations where a com-
petitive market maker would refuse to operate–i.e.,w h e n0 <V θ ≤ V0
4 . In these situations,
there is insuﬃcient manipulative trade to overcome the adverse selection problem faced by
a competitive market maker. In other words, a competitive market maker will be unable to
make zero proﬁts by providing any liquidity, so she will refuse to operate. However, for a de-
cision market maker, information-based trade has the oﬀsetting beneﬁtt h a ti ti m p r o v e sh e r
decision. Thus, she is willing to provide some liquidity despite the severe adverse selection
problem that she faces when she trades with informed traders.
In illiquid markets where uncertainty in the manipulator’s objectives is low (0 <V θ
< V0
4 (1 + c−1)2), Proposition 6 states that the decision market maker sets price sensitivity
below the competitive level (λ
∗ <λ c), which implies that the decision market maker must be
subsidizing liquidity. Lowering price sensitivity below the competitive level will always lead
to trading losses because proﬁts increase with greater price sensitivity and the competitive
level of proﬁts is zero. In terms of her utility, the trading losses incurred by the decision
maker are outweighed by the decision gains she reaps from increased information-based trade.
Although the model in this section has maintained the assumption that the decision
maker behaves as a market maker, none of the results would change if we instead treat the
decision maker as a rational uninformed trader. As an uninformed trader, the decision maker
would also want to subsidize liquidity. She could do this by submitting a random order to a
competitive market maker, who would endogenously provide greater liquidity in response to
this random order ﬂow.
To prove this point, consider a model in which the decision maker submits a random
order ρ,w h e r eρ ∼ N(0,V ρ), to a competitive market maker. The decision maker selects the
distribution of the order, but cannot control the speciﬁc realization of her order. Because
t h es i n g l ep a r a m e t e rVρ is a suﬃcient statistic for the distribution of ρ,w ec a nt h i n ko ft h e
22decision maker as choosing Vρ. For simplicity, we suppose that only the decision maker can
observe the realization of ρ, which occurs after the order is submitted but before the market
clears. This will allow the decision maker to “debias” the market price by accounting for the
eﬀect of the realization of ρ. The competitive market maker only observes aggregate order
ﬂow, but is aware that the decision maker’s random order ﬂow is included in aggregate order
ﬂow.24 In this random trading model, we prove the following result:
Proposition 7 The equilibrium market liquidity (λ
−1), decision rule, and manipulator and
informed trading strategies are the same whether a rational decision maker optimally trades
in the market or optimally makes the market.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 7 shows that the expected equilibrium in the random trading model is the
same as the equilibrium in the market making model. The main point is that our conclusion
about the decision maker’s participation in the market is not dependent on our assumption
that the decision maker can act as a market maker. She can achieve the same expected
utility and outcome by randomly trading in the market with a competitive market maker.
Proposition 7 raises the interesting question of whether agents who behave as noise traders
are merely doing so to learn more from the market price. Before dismissing such agents as
irrational, future theoretical and empirical work should investigate this possibility.
To further investigate the comparative statics and gain intuition, we numerically solve
for the price sensitivity value set by a decision market maker (λ
∗). In all numerical solutions,
we hold the informed trader’s private information constant (V0 =1 ) and allow uncertainty
in the manipulator’s objectives (Vθ) to vary because our results depend only on the ratio
of uncertainty in the manipulator objectives to private information of the informed trader
(Vθ/V0). We also allow the strength of manipulators’ objectives (c)t ov a r y .W es u p p l e m e n t
these numerical solutions with our analytical solution for the competitive market maker’s
price sensitivity (λc).
Figure 1 depicts a series of solutions for the price sensitivities of the decision market maker
(λ
∗) and the competitive market maker (λc). The liquidity parameters set by the decision
24In practice, writing a contract to enforce this random order would not be too diﬃcult. For example,
suppose a decision maker submits an order to buy ρ contracts, where ρ is the realization from a third-
party random-number generator. The distribution of ρ would need to be public, but the realization could
be public (e.g.,t h ep o i n td i ﬀerence in the SuperBowl) or private (e.g., the spin on a roulette wheel with
normally distributed values). The decision maker’s random order would need to be a binding contract with
the market maker that would be veriﬁed ex ante and enforced ex post by a neutral third party. Anticipating
the distribution of this random order will be a part of total order ﬂow, a competitive market maker would
lower the sensitivity of price to order ﬂow.
23maker and competitive market maker vary with both the strength of the manipulator’s
decision objectives (c) and the uncertainty in his objectives (Vθ).25 Figure 1 shows plots of
λ
∗ and λc versus Vθ with the value of c set at 1.0—i.e., the manipulator’s objectives are just as
strong as the decision maker’s. Thus, each plot depicts the relationship between the decision
market maker’s price sensitivity (λ) and uncertainty in the manipulator’s objectives (Vθ).
[Insert Figure 1 around here.]
In both plots in Figure 1, price sensitivity declines with uncertainty in the manipulator’s
decision objectives (Vθ). In fact, when uncertainty in the manipulator’s objectives approaches
zero, both the decision maker and the competitive market maker supply no liquidity at all.26
However, the competitive market maker shuts down when uncertainty in the manipulator’s
objectives is small (Vθ < V0
4 ), whereas the decision market maker still accepts some orders
when there is little uncertainty in the manipulator’s objectives (0 <V θ < V0
4 ). The numerical
results also show that a decision market maker will sometimes subsidize liquidity even when
a competitive market maker would be willing to operate–e.g., Vθ > V0
4 .
Figure 1 conﬁrms the relationship established in Proposition 6: the decision maker’s
price sensitivity (λ
∗) is lower than a competitive market maker’s price sensitivity (λc)w h e n
uncertainty in the manipulator’s objectives (Vθ) is small. The interpretation is that the
decision maker subsidizes liquidity when the market is most illiquid. Furthermore, the ﬁgure
conﬁrms that the decision market maker always supplies at least as much liquidity as the
competitive market maker–i.e., λ
∗ is never higher than λc.T h i s r e s u l t f o l l o w s a l m o s t
directly from our assumption of competition in market making. Intuitively, raising price
sensitivity (λ) above the competitive level would imply greater than zero proﬁts, which is
not sustainable because uninformed market makers would drive these proﬁts to zero.
The ﬁgure reveals that a decision market maker will set the same liquidity parameter as a
competitive market maker when either the manipulator’s decision objectives are suﬃciently
uncertain (large Vθ). In other words, when the manipulator is already supplying a lot of liq-
uidity to the market, the decision maker will not subsidize liquidity. In these cases, liquidity
subsidies are not needed because the price manipulator is already attracting order ﬂow from
the insider who is trading intensely based on his information. A simple interpretation of
25We also obtain solutions for k,w h i c hr a n g eb e t w e e n1/2 and 1. k<1 when the decision maker is
subsidizing liquidity and k =1in an unsubsidized competitive market, regardless of the market maker.
26In numerical results not shown here, we have veriﬁed that almost all of the comparative statics that
apply to the uncertainty in the manipulator’s objectives (Vθ) also apply to the strength of the manipulator’s
objectives (c). This is consistent with Propositions 5 and 6.
24this result is that the liquidity supplied by the manipulator is a substitute for the liquidity
subsidy provided by the decision maker.
[Insert Figure 2 around here.]
Figure 2 illustrates the trading proﬁts of the market maker, the informed trader and
the manipulator for diﬀerent levels of variance in the manipulator’s objectives. When the
variance in the manipulator’s objectives is low, he undertakes small positions. This small
uninformed order ﬂow leads to low market liquidity, making the informed trader reluctant to
place large orders. In this case, the market maker must subsidize liquidity in order to elicit
information from the informed trader. Thus, Figure 2 conﬁrms the idea that the liquidity
subsidy is sometimes a substitute for uninformed order ﬂow.27
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper builds on theories in mechanism design, contracts and ﬁnance. Unlike previous
analyses, we focus on how to write contingent contracts with experts who have a vested
interest in the decision. This means that the experts will consider how their forecasts or
market behavior will inﬂuence the decision.
We derive three key results. First, we provide a theoretical rationale for the use of
information markets in decision making tasks. Speciﬁcally, we show that markets for claims
on decision-relevant variables can be eﬃcient incentive schemes for eliciting information.
Although these markets are somewhat unconventional in that the decision maker oﬀers each
trader a diﬀerent price schedule and charges an entrance fee, the contingent transfer payments
between agents are equivalent to trades in decision markets. If a decision maker cannot
identify diﬀerent traders, then she cannot oﬀer diﬀerent price schedules and levy entrance
fees, making this market more conventional.
Second, our model shows that a decision maker will subsidize liquidity in illiquid decision
markets to gather valuable information. In our Kyle-type model, the decision maker always
provides at least as much liquidity as a competitive market maker and often provides more.
There are even some situations in which a competitive market maker would refuse to operate,
but a decision maker would be willing to supply some liquidity and incur expected trading
losses. From the decision maker’s perspective, some trade in a market for decision-relevant
27At extremely low values of variance in the manipulator’s preferences, the liquidity subsidy and liquidity
supplied by manipulators are complements. We do not emphasize this eﬀect because it arises from the
well-known adverse selection problem faced by all market makers and is not unique to the model here.
25information is better than none. We also show that the decision maker can implement her
desired liquidity policy either directly as the market maker or indirectly as a noise trader
participating in a competitive market.
Third, our model demonstrates that the mere act of linking the decision to the market
price will typically enhance liquidity in the market. Thus, liquidity may be less of a problem
in decision markets than in traditional information or asset markets. In decision markets,
experts may choose to trade because they have strong decision objectives. Moreover, this
manipulative trading is a substitute for the liquidity subsidy provided by a decision maker.
T h i sc a nb ec o m p a r e dw i t ht h em o r ec o n v e n t i o n a li n f o r m a t i o nm a r k e tc a s ei nw h i c he v e n
experts with decision objectives will not trade. In both markets, however, liquidity subsidies
may be useful for obtaining information. Although we derive special cases of optimal liquidity
subsidies in this paper, the form of the optimal subsidies in more general settings requires
further investigation.
We believe that information and decision markets are likely to become more prevalent in
the future.28 While we have developed a parsimonious theory of how such markets could be
designed eﬃciently, it remains to be seen whether such mechanisms will actually work well
in practice.
More research is needed to understand the properties of diﬀerent kinds of decision mar-
kets. For example, little is known about the theoretical properties of decision markets in
which the decision itself has an impact on the realization of decision-relevant information.
Applied research, including both laboratory and real-world experiments, can assess how ro-
bust diﬀerent decision markets are in practice. Whereas information markets have been found
to forecast extremely well, decision markets have not been studied empirically. There are
compelling theoretical reasons to expect diﬀerent behavior in decision markets, but theory
alone cannot address this issue.
28It is interesting to note, however, that decision makers informally condition their policies on market
prices as a matter of routine. For example, ﬁrms condition their decisions of whether to launch a new
product on prevailing prices in related markets. Firms often decide whether to issue equity based on recent
equity returns. The Federal Reserve decides whether to cut interest rates based on inﬂation rates.
26Appendix A
In this appendix, we prove Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Proposition 1: When experts’ decision objectives (θi) are observable, the decision maker
maximizes welfare using the decision rule x∗(b r)=
P
b rj and transfer rule t∗
i(b r,y)=2 cθi(y −
P
b rj).
Proof: Exploiting the revelation principle (e.g., Myerson, 1979), we can restrict our
search for optimal contracts to those in which all experts truthfully report their private
signals (ri). Calling expert i’s report of his update to his posterior b ri,e x p e r ti’s incentive












The individual rationality constraint is:
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under the assumption that the decision maker will implement his best guess based on all
N−1 participating experts’ signals if one expert unilaterally opts out of the mechanism. The
individual rationality constraint (12) will be satisﬁed by the proposed mechanism because








i from participating, which






j )−1 − cθ
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i. Intuitively, expected transfers and decision
inﬂuence are zero regardless of participation, so it makes sense to participate and improve
the quality of information used in decision making.29
To satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (11), it is suﬃcient for the expert util-
i t yf u n c t i o ni n1 1t os a t i s f yt h eﬁrst- and second-order conditions for the maximization in
(11). So the decision maker must choose transfers ti(b r,y) to satisfy these equations. After
substituting the conjectured decision rule x∗(b r)=
P
b rj,t h es i m p l i ﬁed ﬁrst-order condition









29Because the optimal contract must satisfy incentive compatibility, each expert will report his information
truthfully if he participates. Thus, the expert’s decision preferences will not aﬀect his information report
and will not inﬂuence the decision.
27When an expert has decision objectives that are aligned with the decision maker’s (θi =0 ),
no incentive is necessary to motivate this expert to reveal his information. He is intrinsically
motivated to reveal information by his desire to reduce his own loss function from the decision
outcome.
More generally, we can integrate both sides of this equation with respect to b ri to gain
insight into the form of the optimal transfer function. The result of this integration must
contain a term of the form −2cθib ri. Furthermore, note that the second-order incentive
compatibility condition is satisﬁed because the expert’s loss from the optimal decision rule
is a negative quadratic function of (i.e.,c o n c a v ei n )b ri.
In addition, the decision maker would like to reduce each expert’s expected transfers to
zero to maximize her utility. This can be done without altering incentive compatibility by
combining the −2cθib ri with another term that does not depend on expert i’s report and




i(b r,y)=2 cθi(y −
X
b rj) (14)
It is straightforward to verify that this transfer has an expectation of zero and satisﬁes the
ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for incentive compatibility. Therefore the decision rule x∗
and the transfer payments t∗ constitute an optimal contract for the decision maker. QED.
Proposition 2: When experts’ decision objectives (θi) are unobservable, the decision
maker maximizes welfare using the decision rule x∗(b γ)=
P





j b γj) − ti,w h e r eα1i > 0, α2i > 0,a n dti are given by:




























Proof:T h eﬁrst step is to identify all incentive compatible transfer functions when the
optimal decision rule is used. Substituting the transfer ti(b γ) and decision rule x =
P
b γi into


























After further simpliﬁcation, we can express the expected marginal transfer in terms of



























The linearity in signals and types suggests a strategy for choosing an optimal transfer
function. We will consider a transfer function which is quadratic in b γi, substitute this
function in the equation above and match the coeﬃcients on si and θi in the equation above.
O u rt r a n s f e rf u n c t i o nm u s th a v ea tl e a s tt w of r e ep a r a m e t e r st oe n s u r et h a tw ec a nm a t c h
the two coeﬃcients.




j b γj) − ti is an optimal transfer
function, where ti is a lump sum payment to expert i. To examine this conjecture, we
diﬀerentiate this transfer function with respect to b γi a n dt a k ei t se x p e c t a t i o nt oo b t a i na n





(b γi = γi)
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visi − 2α2iwi(si + θi/vi) (21)
This equation can be rearranged slightly to facilitate matching coeﬃcients with equation
(20):





29Matching the si coeﬃcients in equation (21) simpliﬁes to:










Because vi >w i as long as Vθ ≥ 0 and Vi ≥ 0 with at least one inequality being strict, this
implies that α1i > 0 and α2i > 0. This means that the transfer function hypothesized above
is concave in b γi. Combining this concave transfer with the concave decision rule yields a
total transfer function that satisﬁes the second-order condition for incentive compatibility.30
The ﬁnal step is to calculate the expectation of the above transfer E (ti(γ,y)) and set it
to zero to solve for ti. The interpretation is that ti is the expected trading proﬁts of expert

































j b γj) − ti is an optimal transfer function with a zero expectation. QED.
Proposition 3:W h e nVθ is suﬃciently small, then α2
α1 < 1.H o w e v e r , w h e n Vθ ≥ V0,
then α2
α1 ≥ 1.

















j6=i wj − 1
´
. After substituting α2i = c(
vi
wi −1),
this can be simpliﬁed to:
30Experts’ individual rationality constraints do not bind because the decision maker can impose arbitrarily
large punishments on experts by choosing an undesirable decision. By imposing a decision outcome loss on
any non-participating trader equal to or greater than the entrance fee, the decision maker can guarantee
that all experts participate. Speciﬁcally, if any expert does not participate, the decision maker can make a
very high judgment half the time and a very low judgment half the time. This induces all experts to report
and accept the decision made based on all experts’ reports.




































,w h e r ezj = Vj + 1
v2
j Vθ for
all j and vj = V0























































The second term is less than 1 when Vθ is suﬃciently small, implying that α1i − α2i > 0 or
α2i
α1i < 1.H o w e v e r ,w h e nVθ ≥ V0, then the all three multiplied terms in the second term are
g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt o1, implying that α1i − α2i ≤ 0 or α2
α1 ≥ 1.Q E D .

















vi−wi). To calculate the derivative of this expression,
we will ﬁrst calculate the derivative of various terms.












Vθ)−1.D i ﬀerentiating this expression for






















































































































































∂Vi > 0 for Vθ suﬃciently small. QED.









V0 when Vθ > V0
4 and refuse to operate otherwise. The decision rule is x =
p = s/2+θ/2 when the market maker is competitive. A competitive market maker supplies
more liquidity (λ
−1
c is higher) when experts have stronger decision objectives (c increases),
more uncertain objectives (Vθ increases), or less information (V0 decreases). Informed traders

















Vθ θ when Vθ > V0
4 . Otherwise, both types will not trade.
Proof: We must verify that such an equilibrium exists. First, note that when the decision
maker cannot credibly commit to a price-contingent rule, then k will be chosen such that








Given her decision rule in (10), the decision maker still must decide how much to subsidize
liquidity provision (λ)i nt h em a r k e t .
We can substitute the hypothesized pricing and trading rules from (7) and (9) into the
informed trader’s utility maximization problem:
qI ∈ argmax
e qI
{Ey,s,θ [b qI(y − λ(qM + b qI))]} (30)
32Diﬀerentiating the informed trader’s objective function and using the distributional as-





Matching coeﬃcients in the derived and assumed informed trading rules ((31) and (8)),















N o ww ec a nc o m p u t ea g g r e g a t eo r d e rﬂow from informed traders and uninformed ma-










Using this order ﬂow expression, we can calculate the expectation of the decision-relevant























Equation (36) gives the equilibrium price that would prevail in the decision market if a













is the liquidity parameter that a competitive market maker would
set. Simplifying this λc equation and substituting the appropriate value for k using equation












4 .I fVθ ≤
V0
4 , a competitive market maker will refuse to accept orders because
the adverse selection problem is too severe for him to break even for any value of λc.
33We can solve for the decision rule parameter k when the market maker is competitive by
plugging equation (37) for λc into equation (29) to obtain k =1 , which implies x = p.B y
substituting equation (37) for λc into equations (32) and (33), we obtain the solutions for
the informed trader’s strategy and the manipulator’s strategy.
N o ww eh a v ev e r i ﬁed the equation for λc, the decision rule x = p,a n dt h et r a d e r s ’
equilibrium strategies. To establish the comparative statics for liquidity, we need to take





































¢2 > 0 (40)
The derivatives of the reciprocal λ
−1
c h a v et h eo p p o s i t es i g n .Q E D .
Proposition 6:W h e nVθ ≥ V0
4 (1 + c−1)2, a decision maker who makes a market for
decision-relevant information will select a pricing rule p = λ
∗Q such that λ
∗ = λc,w h e r eλc








At these values of Vθ, the decision maker will not intervene in the market. However, for
intermediate values in which
V0
4 <V θ <
V0
4 (1+c−1)2, the decision maker will act as a market
maker with a price sensitivity of λ
∗ <λ c.F u r t h e r m o r e ,f o r0 <V θ ≤ V0
4 , the decision maker
will set a ﬁnite λ
∗, whereas a competitive market maker will not operate. In the cases in
which Vθ < V0
4 (1 + c−1)2, the decision market maker incurs trading losses, but obtains more
precise decision-relevant information than the competitive market maker.
Proof: Now we consider the case in which the decision maker also makes the market for
decision-relevant information. Before solving for the decision maker’s liquidity parameter
choice λ, we need to solve for the coeﬃcient k that she will use in her decision rule x = kp.
Using equation (29), substituting expressions for Va r(Q) and Cov(y,Q) and simplifying, we
obtain an implicit solution for k(λ):








When Vθ = V0
4 ,t h e nk approaches 1 as λ →∞ .W h e nVθ approaches zero, then k approaches






(k − 2)2ck2(1 + ck2λ)+8 λc2k3 Vθ
V0




The decision maker will anticipate that she will use a decision rule k(λ) when she picks
her liquidity parameter λ to maximize her utility. Her utility depends on both the conditional
variance of decision-relevant information and her trading proﬁts–i.e., her liquidity subsidy
costs. Using the decision maker’s pricing rule (7) and the aggregate order ﬂow equation (35),
we obtain an expression for her expected trading proﬁts:
E[Q(p − y)] = λV − C subject to λV − C ≤ 0 (43)





Vθ.R e c a l lt h a t
the decision maker cannot earn positive proﬁts as a market maker because she faces perfect
competition from other uninformed market makers. Note that the decision maker accepts a
trading loss if she sets λ<C / V = λc.
We can compute the informativeness of order ﬂow using the expressions for aggregate
order ﬂow Q in equation (35) and the conditional expectation of decision-relevant information






















Combining the expressions for the decision maker’s trading proﬁts (43) and the noise in









subject to the constraints that λ and k satisfy equation (41) and λV − C<0.
35We can now simplify the decision maker’s utility function by substituting equation (29)








subject to k(λ) ≥ 1 (46)
where we have implicitly imposed the constraint by allowing k to depend on λ through
equation (41). Also, we have imposed k(λ) ≥ 1, which is equivalent to the competition
constraint that prevents the decision maker from obtaining positive expected trading proﬁts.
This equivalence holds because non-positive expected proﬁts means λV − C ≤ 0,w h i c h
implies k = C
λV ≥ 1 from equation (29).




4, which means that a competitive market maker would supply some ﬁnite level of
liquidity to the market. To assess how much liquidity the decision maker would supply, we
can evaluate the derivative of the above expression under the alternative assumptions that
k =1and k>1.
Now let’s investigate whether k =1is an equilibrium. Again, using equation (29), we
can infer that λ = λc. To assess whether this choice of λ is optimal for the decision maker,
we must calculate her marginal utility of λ at λc and k =1 . We will focus on the marginal
utility of λ as λ approaches λc from below. This marginal utility must be non-negative at














when λ<λ c (47)
























which is consistent with our initial assumption that
Vθ
V0 > 1
4. W ec o n c l u d et h a tλ
∗ = λc
and k =1is optimal for the decision maker when the market is suﬃciently liquid under
competition (i.e., λc ≤ 1), which occurs when there is a suﬃcient degree of manipulative
trade (i.e., Vθ ≥ V0
4 (1 + c−1)2).
31We have also veriﬁed that dU/dλ < 0 for λ<λ c, which (along with equation (48)) is suﬃcient to
guarantee that k =1and λ = λc is an equilibrium.
36We can reuse the marginal utility equation (48) to assess the situations in which k>1
and λ
∗ <λ c is an equilibrium. Note that the marginal utility of λ is strictly negative at
λ
∗ = λc and k =1when V0
4 <V θ < V0
4 (1 + c−1)2. This implies the decision maker would
like to lower λ below the competitive level, which means that λ
∗ <λ c and k>1 is an
equilibrium. Furthermore, k must be less than 2 to satisfy equation (41), implying that
1 <k<2.
Now we consider the case in which
Vθ
V0 ≤ 1
4. In this case, a competitive market maker
will not supply any liquidity to the market because there is no ﬁnite λ at which a market
maker can make non-negative trading proﬁts. To show that a decision market maker will
set a ﬁnite value of λ, we only need to show that she receives a greater utility by accepting
arbitrarily small trading losses than she receives when the market is closed.
From equation (46), we see that the decision maker’s utility is zero when the market is
closed because she incurs no trading losses and her decision will not depend on the (non-
existent) market price. Now we must compare this utility to her utility from setting a ﬁnite,
but arbitrarily high, value of λ.
First, we solve for the value of k that is consistent with λ →∞ . Taking the limit of both




V0. Only the k>1 solution
is relevant because, as noted earlier, k<1 is incompatible with the non-positive trading
proﬁts in a competitive equilibrium. Now we can insert this expression for the limit of k in





when λ →∞ . We conclude that the decision maker is better oﬀ keeping the market open
and accepting a small trading loss.
Finally, we can infer that the decision maker is obtaining better decision-relevant information–
i.e., Va r(y|p = λ
∗Q) <V a r (y|p = λcQ)–in the cases in which she is accepting trading
losses. This must be true in order for λ
∗ to be a maximum. QED
Proposition 7: The equilibrium market liquidity (λ
−1), decision rule, and manipulator
and informed trading strategies are the same whether a rational decision maker optimally
trades in the market or optimally makes the market.
Proof: We can establish an equivalence between the two equilibria by showing that the
decision maker solves the same constrained optimization problem in both models. In the
market making model, we have already shown that the objective function is given by (45).
The decision maker maximizes this function subject to the constraint given by equation (41).
Thus, the proof consists of writing down the analogous problem for a decision maker who
opts to randomly trade in the market with a competitive market maker.
37In the random trading model, the decision maker submits a random order ρ,w h e r e
ρ ∼ N(0,V ρ), to the competitive market maker. The decision maker selects the distribution
of the order, but cannot control the speciﬁc realization of her order. Because the single
parameter Vρ is a suﬃcient statistic for the distribution of ρ, we can think of the decision
maker as choosing Vρ. For simplicity, we suppose that only the decision maker can observe
the realization of ρ, which occurs after the order is submitted but before the market clears.
This will allow the decision maker to “debias” the market price by accounting for the eﬀect
of the realization of ρ. The competitive market maker only observes aggregate order ﬂow,
but is aware that the decision maker’s random order ﬂow is included in aggregate order ﬂow.
To show the market making and random trading problems faced by the decision maker
are analogous, we will ﬁrst show that the constraints are analogous. Then we will show
that the objective functions are analogous, implying that the solutions must be the same.
Throughout the proof, we will denote the variables and parameters in the random trading
model by the same notation as in the market making model except for the subscript T–e.g.,
the equilibrium price is given by pT rather than p.
Because he treats the decision maker as a noise trader, the competitive market maker
maintains a simple linear pricing rule given by pT = λT(QT + ρ),w h e r eQT = qIT + qMT.
After she observes the realization of ρ, the decision maker can infer the aggregate order ﬂow
of all other traders by inverting the equilibrium price:
pT/λT − ρ = QT (49)
The aggregate order ﬂow of the informed agent and the manipulator (QT)i sas u ﬃcient
statistic for the decision maker’s inference about the conditional expectation of y. Applying





w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned CT = Cov(y,QT) and VT = Va r(QT). N o t et h a tt h e s ed e ﬁnitions
imply CT = C and VT = V , which will be useful later.
As before, we assume the decision maker cannot commit to any decision other than her
ex post optimal choice, which is xT = E(y|QT). Using equations (50) and (49), this choice




(pT/λT − ρ)=kTQT + kρρ (51)
w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned two decision rule parameters, kT =
CT
λTVT and kρ = −
CT
VT , to facilitate
our analogy with the market making model. Moreover, we note that kT =
CT
λTVT is identical
to the expression for k in the market making model (after substituting the random trading
model parameters).
Because the decision in the random trading model depends linearly on the equilibrium
p r i c ej u s ta st h ed e c i s i o ni nt h em a r k e tm o d e ld i d ,w ec a nr e u s et h ef o r m u l a sf o rt h ei n f o r m e d
trader’s and manipulator’s strategies—i.e., equations (33) and (32). Making the appropriate




TλT . Because each of these expressions is identical (after substituting the
random trading model parameters) to its market making model counterpart, this implies
that QT is directly analogous to Q in the market making model. Combining this fact with
t h ef a c tt h a tkT is directly analogous to k, we can derive an equation directly analogous to
the market making model constraint on k in (41):









This proves that the constraint in the random trading model is isomorphic to the constraint
in the market making model. Next, we will show that the objective functions are also
isomorphic.
As a random trader, the decision maker again receives proﬁts from two sources. First, the
decision maker reaps proﬁts from her random trading activity. Second, the decision maker
proﬁts from her production decision, which is informed by the equilibrium market price. Her
random trading proﬁts are given by:
E(ρ(y − pT)) = −λTVρ (53)






Furthermore, the competitive market maker will set λT so that he will attain zero proﬁts
conditional on aggregate order ﬂow (QT +ρ). Using the standard Kyle arguments described
39earlier, we can solve for the liquidity parameter λT:
λT =
Cov(y,QT + ρ)





Note that equation (55) implies there is a one-to-one mapping between Vρ and λT, implying
that we can treat the decision maker’s random trading problem as one where she chooses λT.
We rearrange equation (55) slightly, solving for the expected trading proﬁts of the decision
maker:
−λTVρ = λTVT − CT (56)
Using (53), (54) and (56), we can write the decision maker’s total utility with random
trading as:





which depends only on λT.
Because CT = C and VT = V , this random trading objective function above is isomorphic
to the objective function for the decision maker when she makes the market (see (45)).
Because both the objective functions and constraints are isomorphic, it follows that the
random trading and market making problems have the same equilibria. In other words,







variance in the order ﬂow from the informed trader must be equal to the total variance in the
order ﬂow from uninformed traders—i.e., the manipulator and the randomly trading decision
maker. QED.
40Appendix B
This appendix discusses and motivates the two modiﬁcations to the optimal contract
from Section 4 that lead us to consider a simpler decision market in Section 5. First, we
suppose that decision makers cannot identify individual traders. Second, we suppose that
t h ed e c i s i o nm a k e rc a n n o tc o m m i tt oad e c i s i o nr u l et h a ti sn o ti nh e rb e s ti n t e r e s ta f t e rt h e
market clears.
In many applications, assigning diﬀerent contracts to diﬀerent traders (e.g., ti(b γ,y) 6=
tj(b γ,y)) based on their characteristics will not be feasible. Discrimination may be impossible
because certain characteristics are unobservable, illegal because certain characteristics are
explicitly protected by law, or unacceptable because certain characteristics are implicitly
protected by social norms. But perhaps most importantly, discrimination will create contract
resale opportunities for other traders unless the following no-arbitrage conditions are met:
ti(b γi,b γj,γ−i,j)+tj(b γi,b γj,γ−i,j)=ti+j(b γi + b γj,γ−i,j), ∀ b γi,b γj,γ−i,j (58)
ti(b γi,b γj,γ−i,j)=tj(b γi,b γj,γ−i,j), ∀ b γi,b γj,γ−i,j (59)
The ﬁrst constraint can be viewed as the combination of order ﬂow consolidation and order
ﬂow splitting arbitrage restrictions. Speciﬁcally, we rule out transfer schemes in which traders
can proﬁt by either bundling or splitting their orders.32 The second constraint ensures that
transfer rules do not discriminate based on traders’ identities.
To see how these constraints can be violated, recall that the optimal contract in section
4 requires that the decision maker impose an entrance fee on each trader participating in the
mechanism. This violates no-arbitrage because each trader, after incurring the entrance fee,
has an incentive to become a broker for other traders. He can collect other traders’ entrance
fees and costlessly route these orders to the decision maker by consolidating them with his
own order. Suﬃcient competition from dual-class traders diverting order ﬂow would drive
the entrance fee towards zero. Dual-class traders would reap the entire beneﬁts from the
optimal contract’s liquidity subsidy, forcing the decision maker to incur the entire cost of
the subsidy. Thus, feasible contracts must not impose an entrance fee.
The general consequence of no-arbitrage is that the transfer rule must be of the form:
t(b γ,y)=b γif(y,
P
j b γj).N o t e t h a t t(b γi =0 )=0 , implying there is no entrance fee for a
trader that reports b γi =0 . To simplify the optimal contract, we assume that all traders have
32Order ﬂow splitting imposes one inequality constraint, while order ﬂow consolidation imposes the other
inequality constraint, leading to an equality constraint.
41equally precise information and equally strong decision objectives. This modeling restric-
tion allows contracts that satisfy no-arbitrage to satisfy simultaneously all traders’ incentive
compatibility constraints–e.g., see equation (20) in section 4.
Importantly, any contract that satisﬁes no-arbitrage and implements a decision rule based




) will also satisfy the interim individual ratio-
nality constraint–i.e., all experts will be willing to participate even after observing their
private signals and objectives. To see this, note that incentive compatibility implies that
a participating expert prefers to report the truth to reporting any other value of b γi.I n
particular, he prefers reporting the truth to reporting b γi =0 , which would provide him with




)a sn o t
participating at all. Formally, if the incentive compatibility constraint holds and the decision
rule depends only on the sum of reports, then the interim individual rationality constraint
must also hold.
There are at least two ways to justify decision rules that depend only on the posterior
mean of y. First, the posterior mean (
P
j γj)i sas u ﬃcient statistic for the dependence of
the principal’s utility on the decision outcome. Although each agent has individual decision
objectives and information about the decision, the decision maker cannot allow the decision
to have a diﬀerent dependence on each agent’s signal and objectives unless she can identify
particular agents. Thus, applying the suﬃcient statistic theorem in Holmstrom (1979), there
is no loss of generality in considering only the class of contracts with decisions that depend
only on (
P
j γj).33 Second, if the decision maker cannot commit to a sub-optimal decision,
then her decision rule must be the optimal ex post rule, which is given by x∗ = E(y|η)= X
γi. Again, this no-commitment contract depends only on the suﬃcient statistic for the
posterior mean.
Using the results from the previous section, we know that the no-commitment deci-
sion rule implies the only incentive compatible transfers must include a term of the form
t(b γ,y)=α1b γi(y− α2
α1
P
j b γj). Fortunately, this transfer function also satisﬁes the no-arbitrage
requirement above. But, as noted earlier, the entrance fee t does not satisfy the no-arbitrage
restriction. Thus, when commitment is not possible, we conclude that the optimal contract
remains the same as before, except that there is no entrance fee.
To summarize this discussion, we assume traders have equally precise signals and equally
33There may be other natural justiﬁcations for decision rules of this form. For example, we could impose
the restriction that decisions cannot be manipulated by coalitions of experts–e.g., x(b γi,b γj,γ−i,j)=x(b γi +
b γj,γ−i,j), ∀ b γi,b γj,γ−i,j.
42strong decision objectives and that the decision maker cannot commit to a suboptimal de-
cision rule. In addition, we rule out contracts that admit arbitrage opportunities. These
assumptions allow us to characterize the optimal contract as t(b γ,y)=α1b γi(y− α2
α1
P
j b γj) and
x =
P
j b γj. This contract is equivalent to an anonymous market for contingent claims on y
that are priced at α2
α1
P
j b γj. The two parameters in the transfer function govern the liquidity
subsidy: α2
α1 determines the sensitivity of price to order ﬂow and α1 determines the overall









. For the remainder of the paper, we focus on simple decision markets for
contingent contracts of the sort described above.
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45Figure 1. Price sensitivity vs. uncertainty in manipulator objectives. The graph
depicts the competitive market maker’s price sensitivity to aggregate order ﬂow, λc,a n dt h e
decision market maker’s sensitivity, λ
∗. Figure 1 shows plots of λ
∗ and λc versus Vθ with
the value of c =1 .0.W eu s et h ea n a l y t i c a ls o l u t i o nf o rλc in equation (37) and a numerical
solution for λ
∗. For the numerical solutions, we impose V0 =1and allow Vθ to vary because
our results depend on the ratio Vθ/V0 of the uncertainty in the manipulator’s objectives to
the prior uncertainty in decision-relevant information.
46Figure 2. Expected trading proﬁts vs. uncertainty in manipulator objectives.
The graph depicts the expected trading proﬁts of an informed trader, a price manipulator
and a decision market maker for the model in section 5. The ﬁgure shows these three trading
proﬁts as a function of the variance in the price manipulator’s objectives over the decision
outcome (Vθ). We use the analytical solution for λc in equation (37) and a numerical solution
for λ
∗. For the numerical solutions, we impose V0 =1and allow Vθ to vary because our results
depend on the ratio Vθ/V0 of the manipulator’s preference uncertainty to the insider’s private
information. In this ﬁgure, we also impose c =1for simplicity–i.e., the strength of the
manipulator’s objectives is equal to the strength of the decision maker’s.
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